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STUDENT NOTE
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-WEST VIRGINIA
CONSUMER CREDIT AND PROTECTION
ACT-DEFINITIONAL INADEQUACIES
In recent years, more than one writer' has predicted that the
Legislature would have to take the initiative in conforming the law
of products liability' in West Virginia to contemporary national
standards. That prediction has become a reality. The West Vir-
ginia Legislature on March 5, 1974, passed the West Virginia Con-
sumer Credit and Protection Act,3 which could significantly affect
products liability law in West Virginia.
Until recently, the general rule throughout the country has
been that manufacturers and other sellers of defective products
have not been liable for injury to persons having no contractual
relation with them.' This harsh rule has gradually been modified
in many jurisdictions by the creation of numerous exceptions.
Most important has been the "inherently dangerous product" ex-
ception announced in Thomas v. Winchester.' Under Thomas, an
injured party not in privity with a negligent seller or manufacturer,
could recover if the injury had been caused by an "inherently
dangerous product," such as explosives, poisons, or drugs.' Even-
, See Cady, Law of Products Liability in West Virginia, 74 W. VA. L. Rxv. 283
(1972); Comment, Products Liability-Innocent Bystanders, 72 W. VA. L. REv. 200
(1970).
2 The definition of "products liability" varies greatly. For example, W. Pnos-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 641 (4th ed. 1971), uses a restrictive definition
of the term: "Products liability is the name currently given to the area of case law
involving the liability of sellers of chattels to third persons with whom they are not
in privity of contract." For the purpose of this article, a broader definition of the
term will be utilized. 1 R. HtmsH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRoDucTS LIABILITY
2 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as HURSH & BAILEY], defines the term as the
"liability of a manufacturer, processor, or non-manufacturing seller for injury to the
person or property of a buyer or third party by a product which has been sold."
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-1-101 to -8-102 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) (dictum).
6 N.Y. 397 (1852). West Virginia apparently adopted this position in Peters
v. Johnson, Jackson & Co., 50 W. Va. 644, 41 S.E. 190 (1902), with the slight
variation that the product had to be only "very dangerous to human life." Addition-
ally, a nonfood exception was created for chewing tobacco. Webb v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co., 121 W. Va. 115, 2 S.E.2d 898 (1939).
5 Peters v. Johnson, Jackson & Co., 50 W. Va. 644, 41 S.E. 190 (1902), involved
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tually, the rule was swallowed by the exceptions in the famous case
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.;7 this case, in effect, brought
all dangerous-if-negligently-made products within the "inherently
dangerous" exception.8 Since 1916, the MacPherson rule has been
consistently liberalized.'
The warranty branch of products liability law has also had
progressive development.' Historically, warranty liability in all
states except Louisiana had been governed by either the Uniform
Sales Act or the common law." West Virginia was a common law
jurisdiction following caveat emptor'2 but had adopted a special
implied warranty exception for food, that allowed only the pur-
chaser of unsealed food to recover for breach of warranty. Cur-
rently, warranty liability is governed, at least partially, in all
states except Louisiana, by the Uniform Commercial Code
[hereinafter referred to as the UCC].' 3
Recent trends have enhanced the individual's ability to
recover when injured by defective products. Several courts have
drugs, but the court also mentioned poisons, defective scaffolds, defectively
repaired gas meters, and hair wash.
7 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
West Virginia has not specifically accepted the rule announced by
MacPherson; however, the Supreme Court of Appeals has stated that MacPherson
has not been rejected. Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225
(1964). In fact, two federal court decisions, making Erie-educated guesses as to the
law in West Virginia, have held that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
would probably adopt the MacPherson rule. Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus
Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954); General Motors Corp. v. Johnson, 137 F.2d 320
(4th Cir. 1943).
E.g., Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
" The liability in negligence of a manufacturer or other supplier for damage
caused by his product is based on the supplier's failure to exercise reasonable care.
Liability in warranty arises where damage is caused by the failure of a product to
measure up to express or implied representations on the part of the manufacturer
or other supplier. Accordingly, an injured person is not required to prove negligence
in a warranty based products liability case. 2 L. FRMUlR & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTs
LuBmmrr § 16.01[1] (1974).
" 1 CCH PROD. LiAB. REP. 1010 (1974). Thirteen jurisdictions, including
West Virginia, have followed the common law approach.
, Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Mkt., 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785 (1939).
" 1 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 1020 (1974). All states except Louisiana have
adopted the UCC. In West Virginia, the following UCC sections are relevant to the
present discussion: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-313 (1966) (express warranties); Id.
§ 46-2-314 (1966) (implied warranty of merchantability); Id. § 46-2-315 (1966)
(implied warranty of fitness); Id. § 46-2-316 (1966) (exclusion or modification of
warranties); Id. § 46-2-318 (1966) (third party beneficiaries of warranties).
2
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rejected the privity of contract requirement" in actions for breach
of implied warranty," and at least one court has held that certain
types of disclaimers are unconscionable as a matter of law."' All of
these developments have helped the injured user recover for his
losses caused through the use of defective products. West Virginia
has not followed this progressive trend."
Although all of these developments have aided injured per-
sons, none has helped as much as the adoption of strict liability
in tort for products liability cases. First adopted in California, the
doctrine states: "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an
article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being." When this doctrine is joined with the
abolition of privity, it makes the manufacturer liable to those in-
jured by the product without regard to negligence."5 Some courts
1" Frequently injuries from products involve a person not in a contractual rela-
tionship with the manufacturer or seller of the product. For example, when a loaf
of bread is bought at a grocery store, the only contractual relationship is that
between the actual buyer and the store proprietor. Only the buyer and the retailer
are parties to the sale, and, thus, only they are in privity of contract. 1 CCH PROD.
LiAB. REP. 1190 (1974).
11 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d
873 (1958).
11 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). This
case was a pre-UCC case that held void a standard automobile disclaimer. See
Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 613, 282 N.E.2d 126, 331 N.Y.S.2d
40 (1970); Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778 (1968). Contra,
Marshall v. Murry Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140 (1967) (The Vir-
ginia court could not find the "overriding reasons of public policy" relied upon by
the New Jersey court in Henningsen.); Payne v. Valley Motor Sales, 146 W. Va.
1063, 124 S.E.2d 622 (1962); Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d
225 (1964). As a result of the validity given disclaimers by the UCC, it seems
unlikely that jurisdictions that have adopted the UCC will follow the Henningsen
concept. 1 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316:13 (2d ed. 1970).
'1 See Cady, Law of Products Liability in West Virginia, 74 W. VA. L. REV. 283
(1972); Lorensen, Product Liability and Disclaimers in West Virginia, 67 W. VA.
L. Rxv. 291 (1965).
"1 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
"1 Strict tort liability as used in this note is the imposition of liability requiring
neither proof of negligence nor proof of breach of warranty, coupled with a relaxa-
tion of the privity requirement. Strict warranty liability as used in this note is
imposition of liability requiring proof of breach o. warranty, but not proof of negli-
gence, coupled with a relaxation of the privity requirement.
[Vol. 77
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have even extended this doctrine to innocent bystanders injured by
the product."
The policy justification for strict tort liability was stated by
Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 21 The ability
to pay for the damage caused by a defective product is often too
burdensome for the person injured; however, the risk and cost of
the injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed
among the customers as a cost of doing business.2
The trend in the United States is clearly toward strict tort
liability. Twenty-seven jurisdictions have definitely adopted strict
tort liability as the controlling law,2 and in no state has the rule
been rejected by the court of last resort.2" The supreme courts of
four states have adopted strict warranty liability.2 Only one
1 Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965);
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
21 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (concurring opinion).
22 Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441. Justice Traynor also stated other justifications
for imposition of strict liability: "Even if there is no negligence, however, public
policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce
the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the mar-
ket." Id., 150 P.2d at 441. Additionally, Justice Traynor noted that the injured
person is often not in a position to refute evidence of the manufacturer, since he is
not familiar with the manufacturing processes.
21 Strict tort liability has been definitely accepted in:
Alaska Louisiana Oregon
Arizona Minnesota Pennsylvania
California Mississippi Rhode Island
Connecticut Missouri South Dakota
Hawaii Nebraska Tennessee
Illinois Nevada Texas
Indiana New Hampshire Washington
Iowa New Jersey Wisconsin
Kentucky New Mexico District of Columbia
HURSH & BAILEY 759 (1974).
24 Id. at 760.
25 Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark. 634, 383 S.W.2d 885 (1964); Manheim
v. Ford Motor Co., 201 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1967); Corprew v. Geigy Chem. Corp., 271
N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967); Springfield v. Williams Plumbing Supply Co., 249
S.C. 130, 153 S.E.2d 184 (1967). In addition, six states have enacted strict warranty
liability by statute: Arkansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and
Virginia. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.1 (Cum. Supp. 1973); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 2-318 (Cum. Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 2-314(1) (Cum. Supp.
1973); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (Cum. Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. §
23-3004 (Cum. Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965).
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state-West Virginia-has failed to express a position on strict
liability." Although the West Virginia court has failed to act as to
strict liability, the Legislature has, with this Act, made an attempt
to assist the forgotten consumer.
The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act is long
and complicated, encompassing eight articles most of which relate
to credit transactions. Article six, entitled "General Consumer
Protection," eliminates several statutory and case law barriers
that have traditionally blocked consumer recovery. Section 46A-6-
107, prohibiting disclaimers, voids any attempt by a merchant to
exclude, limit, or modify any warranty, express or implied, or any
remedy for breach of warranty with respect to goods that are in-
tended to become the subject of a consumer transaction." Addi-
tionally, section 46A-6-108 insures that no action by a consumer
for negligence or breach of warranty will fail for lack of privity
between the consumer and the other party, nor shall an action
against any person bar the bringing of an action against another."
Because of poor legislative drafting, however, the joint effect of
these two sections is not entirely clear.
28 Other states have either passed statutes enacting strict liability or have
judicial decisions announcing or infering a particular position. Until the West Vir-
ginia Legislature passed the Consumer Credit and Protection Act, West Virginia's
only recognizable position was that W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-318 (1966) had slightly
removed the privity barrier.
2' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-107 (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary with
respect to goods which are the subject of or are intended to become the
subject of a consumer transaction, no merchant shall:
(1) Exclude, modify, or otherwise attempt to limit any warranty, ex-
press or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness
for a particular purpose; or
(2) Exclude, modify or attempt to limit any remedy provided by law
including the measure of damages available, for a breach of warranty,
express or implied.
Any such exclusion, modification or attempted limitation shall be void.
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-108 (Cum. Supp. 1974) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, no action
by a consumer for breach of warranty or for negligence with respect to
goods subject to a consumer transaction shall fail because of a lack of
privity between the consumer and the party against whom the claim is
made. An action against any person for breach of warranty or for negli-
gence with respect to goods subject to a consumer transaction shall not
of itself constitute a bar to the bringing of an action against another
person.
[Vol. 77
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Of the two sections, the one placing restrictions on disclaimers
of warranties has fewer major deficiencies. There are two types of
warranties-express29 and implied."0 The practice in West Virginia
has been to disclaim or modify these warranties where practical.
As earlier indicated, a number of jurisdictions have disallowed
certain warranty disclaimers of consumer products as unconscion-
able or against public policy.3" The West Virginia court has not
followed those cases and has generally held disclaimers to be valid.
Recovery was denied in Payne v. Valley Motor Sales,3" a pre-UCC
case, because of a disclaimer in the sales contract. Another West
Virginia case, decided after the UCC was adopted, recognized that
disclaimers were an affirmative defense that had to be set forth
affirmatively in the pleadings." As a result, West Virginia consum-
ers have been unable to maintain actions for breach of warranty
because of the validity of the disclaimers. Seemingly better days
lie ahead for the consumer because of the Act's limitation on dis-
claimers. The extent of the new-founded protection, however, will
depend considerably upon the meaning given to the words "mer-
chant" and "consumer transaction" within the context of this
section.
The Act provides that no merchant shall exclude or modify
any implied or express warranty. The term "warranty" is clearly
and adequately defined in the Act,1 but the term "merchant" is
not defined at all. "Merchant" is defined in the UCC;n however,
nothing in the Act permits the inference that the UCC's definition
is applicable. The National Consumer Act [hereinafter referred to
n W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-313 (1966).
Id. §§ 46-2-314, -315 (1966).
:1 See note 16 supra.
32 146 W. Va. 1063, 124 S.E.2d 622 (1962).
m Skeen v. C & G Corp., 185 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1971).
M W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-102(f) (Cum. Supp. 1974):
"Warranty" means express and implied warranties described and
defined in sections three hundred thirteen, three hundred fourteen and
three hundred fifteen, article two, chapter forty-six of this Code and
expressions or actions of a merchant which assure the consumer that the
goods have described qualities or will perform in a described manner.
Id. § 46-2-104(1) (1966):
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or other-
wise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom
such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent
or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out
as having such knowledge or skill.
6
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as the NCA], 3' from which this disclaimer provision was appar-
ently taken, does not make this mistake, and clearly defines the
term "merchant."3 As used in the NCA, "merchant" is broad
enough to include a retailer, manufacturer, lessor, and any as-
signee of, or successor to, such person. This approach clarifies the
code section and removes the possibility of restrictive judicial in-
terpretation.
This problem should be remedied by the West Virginia Legis-
lature in order to resolve any unnecessary uncertainty. The UCC
definition of "merchant" may be adopted; it is broad enough to
include a seller or a manufacturer." A more restrictive definition
of "merchant" would be inconsistent with current commercial
practices in the UCC and would give the buyer limited protection
and opportunity to recover. There is precedent for using the UCC
definition for the term "merchant." The Maryland anti-disclaimer
act" utilizes the term "seller" and "manufacturer" within the con-
text of the UCC, and Massachusetts has a statutory provision
similar to that of Maryland." The Legislature might alternatively
consider adopting the definition used by the NCA, which would
offer the greatest protection to the consumer but is less in harmony
with the initial legislative enactment than the UCC definition.
Since the section is a limitation upon a UCC-created disclaimer,
it seems logical that the terms used in the section be consistent
with other UCC definitions. In addition, litigation under the UCC,
expanding or contracting interpretation of the term "merchant,"
would apply equally to the new section. Nonetheless, as the West
36 NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER AcT (1970)
[hereinafter cited as NCA]. The NCA was drafted by the National Consumer Law
Center, Boston College Law School, Brighton, Massachusetts.
3 NCA § 1.301(23) provides:
"Merchant" means a person who regularly advertises, distributes,
offers, supplies or deals in real or personal property, services, money or
credit in a manner which directly or indirectly results in or is intended
or designed to result in, lead to or induce a consumer transaction. The
term includes but is not limited to a seller, lessor, manufacturer, arranger
of credit, and any assignee of or successor to such person. The term also
includes a person who by his occupation holds himself out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to such practices or to whom such knowledge
or skill may be attributed by his employment as an agent, broker or other
intermediary who holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
See note 35 supra.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 2-316A (Cum. Supp. 1973).
, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A (Cum. Supp. 1974).
[Vol. 77
7
Stowers: Products Liability--West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1975
STUDENT NOTE
Virginia Act is now written, no one is certain who is precluded from
disclaiming warranties.
Similar confusion exists regarding the phrase "consumer
transaction." Both the Maryland and Massachusetts statutes use
the phrase "sale of consumer goods" in lieu of "consumer transac-
tion," and both states define the phrase "consumer goods" as the
UCC does." This approach is founded upon a rational basis. First,
it provides more certainty as to what goods are involved. Secondly,
it exempts sales of goods that are primarily to be used in the
operation of other businesses and establishments. This approach
is consistent with the UCC's position that limitation of consequen-
tial damages where the loss is commercial is not prima facie un-
conscionable.2 Finally, it attempts to avoid additional uncertainty
as to when a "transaction" occurs by using the word "sale."
The NCA avoided the problem by defining "consumer trans-
action" as a transaction in which one or more of the parties is a
consumer. 3 This approach is superior to the Massachusetts or
Maryland approach because it avoids the ambiguity of "sale" and
"consumer goods," leaving oply the term "transaction" to be inter-
preted by the courts in light of changing social demands and re-
quirements. Either one of these methods would be vastly superior
to the provision as it currently exists.
Overall, the best solution for eliminating the current confusion
is for the Legislature to make two additions to the Act. First, the
term "merchant" should be defined exactly as it is in the UCC.11
Secondly, "consumer transaction" should be defined as the NCA
defines the phrase. These two additions would provide the cer-
tainty that businessmen need to adequately plan and institute
necessary steps to protect the consumer and himself. These addi-
tions would also allow the consumer to readily recognize a void
disclaimer when it appears. These advantages would accrue with-
out compromising the original intent of the Act and without any
interference to the other provisions of the Act.
Section 46A-6-108 provides that no action by a consumer for
negligence or breach of warranty shall fail because of a lack of
1' The UCC states that goods are" 'consumer goods' if they are used or bought
for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes." W. VA. CODE ANN. §
46-9-109(1) (1966).
42 Id. § 46-2-719.
'3 NCA § 1.301(13).
" See note 35 supra.
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privity between the consumer and the other party.45 This section
also suffers from definitional inadequacies-not because of a fail-
ure to define terms, but as the result of the poor definition of
"consumer." "Consumer" is defined in an earlier section of the Act
as "a natural person who incurs debt pursuant to a consumer
credit sale or a consumer loan."4 As defined, "consumer" is appro-
priate for the first five articles of the Act that deal exclusively with
credit transactions but inappropriate when used in the consumer
protection section." Obviously, the Legislature did not intend to
abolish privity only for consumers who buy on an installment plan.
There are two types of privity in the UCC. "Horizontal priv-
ity" limits the extent that third parties benefit from the warranties
buyers receive from sellers. In the UCC, as adopted in West Vir-
ginia, these beneficiaries are individuals in the family or household
of the buyer or guests in his home. 8 "Vertical privity" refers to the
typical manufacturer-distributer-retailer situation and involves
the question of whether a seller's warranty, given to his buyer,
extends to one who purchases from this buyer.49 The UCC takes a
neutral position on the scope of vertical privity; the Consumer
Credit and Protection Act, however, alters this neutrality." Lack
of privity is no longer a defense between a "consumer" and the
party against whom the claim is made. For example, if M, an
automobile manufacturer, sells an automobile to D, a dealer, an
implied warranty of merchantability, unless disclaimed, accompa-
nies that vehicle. When D resells the vehicle to B, a consumer, an
implied warranty of merchantability passes to B. Under the UCC,
B can readily recover from D for breach of that warranty."' The
," W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-108 (Cum. Supp. 1974). For the full text of this
section, see note 28 supra.
"8 Id. § 46A-1-102(11). The essence of this definition is that a person must incur
debt before he is a consumer for purposes of this Act.
" The definition of "consumer" is crucial to the efficient operation of the Act.
As NCA § 1.301(8), Comment 1 states: "This is probably the most important
definition in the entire Act. One definition after another and one substantive provi-
sion after another ties in to the concept of 'consumer'."
U W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-318 (1966):
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in
his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume
or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-318, Comment 3 (1966).
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-108 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
51 Id. § 46-2-714 (1966).
[Vol. 77
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crucial issue involving "vertical privity" is whether B can sue M
for breach of his warranty. As stated above, the UCC is neutral on
this matter, leaving the decision to developing case law." Presum-
ably, under the anti-privity section, if B purchased the goods for
personal use on an installment plan or other appropriate credit
arrangement, he would be a "consumer" within the meaning of the
Act and could sue M for breach of his warranty. But if B paid cash,
he is not a "consumer" within the meaning of the Act, and there-
fore, could not recover. Such an arbitrary distinction is arguably
unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection; the Legislature
certainly did not intend such an absurd result. 3 To apply the
52 As this article was going to press, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals handed down its decision in Dawson v. Canteen Corp., No. 13476 (W. Va.,
filed Feb. 25, 1975). This decision purportedly abolished the privity requirement
in an action for breach of an express or implied warranty in West Virginia. On its
facts the opinion abolished only "vertical" privity leaving the issue of "horizontal"
privity to be controlled by W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-318 (1966). This case has
serious shortcomings in that it fails to adequately explain the relationship between
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-108 (Cum. Supp. 1974), and the holding in the case.
No attempt is made to critically analyze the holding of the case, but it logically
appears that the best approach to the entire problem area is still for the Legislature
to adopt the recommended definition of "consumer" as suggested in this article.
This solution would eliminate the privity problem with respect to both "horizontal"
and "vertical" privity and any future privity problems in negligence-based actions.
It would also prevent the piecemeal approach suggested by the court in this deci-
sion.
. Support for the approach taken by the Legislature can be found in NATIONAL
CONSUMER LAW CENTER, MODEL CONSUMER CREDrr AcT (1973) [hereinafter cited as
CCA]. The CCA is a model for consumer protection prepared by the National
Consumer Law Center, Boston, Massachusetts. CCA §§ 2.503, .504 are virtually
identical to W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-6-107, -108 (Cum. Supp. 1974), with one
major exception. Instead of using the phrase "consumer transaction" as the West
Virginia Act does, the CCA utilizes "consumer credit transaction." The effect of
this is to clearly abolish privity and disclaimers as to credit transactions only.
Relying upon the CCA as authority, it can be persuasively argued that the West
Virginia Legislature intended to take the same approach. However, there are sev-
eral reasons supporting an opposite viewpoint. First, the CCA deals exclusively with
credit transactions; the West Virginia Act does not. Secondly, the West Virginia
Act is patterned after the NCA which does not make such a distinction. Thirdly,
within an Act that involves both cash and credit transactions there is no rational
basis for making such a distinction. At best, the only logical reason why the CCA
refers to "consumer credit transactions" is because the CCA deals exclusively with
credit; to involve cash transactions for the purpose of that section only would have
destroyed the continuity of the CCA. It seems apparent that when the Legislature
enacted article six, entitled "General Consumer Protection," it meant to protect
more than consumers who buy on the installment plan. Compare W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 46A-6-101 to -7-116 (Cum. Supp. 1974), with CCA § 2.503, .504 and NCA §§
3.301, .306.
10
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present definition of "consumer" to the anti-privity section totally
frustrates any constructive use of the consumer protection article.
Logically, the best way to correct this situation is to give the
term "consumer" a different definition for article six only." One
of the most liberal definitions of "consumer" applied in any act is
that contained in the proposed Federal Consumers Products Lia-
bility Act." That act defines "consumer" as any natural person,
including a bystander, who uses, consumes, or is affected by use
of a consumer product. 6 If the term "consumer" were so defined
in the West Virginia Act, the result would be strict warranty liabil-
ity57 The Act discloses a legislative policy to follow some form of
strict warranty liability and leaves the door open to strict tort
liability if the court should so decide." Other jurisdictions have
taken a similar approach.
Recent actions by the Virginia courts and legislature should
give some guidance in the interpretation of the West Virginia anti-
privity statute. In 1961, two attempts were made in the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals to attack the privity requirement. One
nonfood case held that privity was required to recover for breach
of an implied warranty by an employee in a personal injury case
against the seller of a tagline to the plaintiff's employer." In an-
other case, the Virginia court held that privity was required for
recovery in a negligence case in which the product was not inher-
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-1-102 (Cum. Supp. 1974) allows terms to be defined
differently in subsequent articles.
I Statutes, A Federal Consumers Products Liability Act, 7 HARv. J. LEols. 568
(1970).
SFEDERA CONSUMERS PRODucTs Lxmary Acr § 102(4), quoted in 7 HARv. J.
LEGis. 568, 576 (1970).
n To a large extent, any state that has adopted the UCC has a form of strict
warranty liability. When used in this note, however, strict warranty liability means
more than adoption of the UCC. A significant relaxation of the privity requirement
is also required. See notes 19, 25 supra.
I The imposition of strict tort liability is usually a step-by-step process. This
process has frequently followed a definite pattern: (1) the elimination of the privity
requirement with respect to foods and beverages; (2) the rejection of privity where
sellers have advertised their products; (3) the abandonment of privity and the
extension of warranty liability to cover the sale of any product; and (4) the exten-
sion of warranty liability resulting in acceptance of the strict liability in tort doc-
trine. 1 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 4050 (1974).
5' See note 25 supra.
' Harris v; Hampton Roads Tractor & Equip. Co., 202 Va. 958, 121 S.E.2d 471
(1961).
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ently dangerous.' In response to these decisions, the Virginia legis-
lature passed an anti-privity statute.2 It was the intention of the
Virginia drafters to make the new law applicable to both vertical
and horizontal privity and to include only the limitation of foresee-
ability as a restraint on the Act's coverage. 3 One commentator has
indicated that the approach taken by Virginia was to legislatively
adopt strict warranty liability.64 The keystone of this approach is
section 2-314 of the UCC, which imposes upon sellers a duty to
deliver merchantable goods. 5 Thus the general conclusion is that
in Virginia a seller or manufacturer has a duty to sell or produce
merchantable goods, and any individual injured because of a
breach of this warranty can recover against anyone in the distribu-
tive chain without proof of fault so long as his injury was foresee-
able.
The West Virginia Legislature apparently attempted to adopt
a similar approach. The anti-privity section of the Act was taken
verbatim from the NCA, 6 and the NCA comment supports the
argument that the West Virginia definition of "consumer" is a
mistake and that the section seeks to take a position somewhat
similar to that taken by Virgina.6 7 The NCA comment states:
"This section is designed clearly and succinctly to 'topple the cita-
del of privity' once and for all."6 As enacted in West Virginia, the
section does not come close to achieving that ideal. The NCA
defines "consumer,""6 but the definition obviously applies to "vert-
, General Bronze Corp. v. Kostopulos, 203 Va. 66, 122 S.E.2d 548 (1961).
'$ VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965) provides:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any
action brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods to recover
damages for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence,
although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from the defendant, if
the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer or seller might reason-
ably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods ....
" Emroch, Statutory Elimination of Privity Requirement in Products Liability
Cases, 48 VA. L. REv. 982, 986 (1962).
64 Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REy. 804, 817 (1965).
6 Id. at 814. The relevant West Virginia section is W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-
314 (1966).
8 1 Compare W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-108 (Cum. Supp. 1974), with NCA
§ 3.304.
67 NCA § 3.304, Comment 1.
es Id.
11 NCA § 1.301(8). "'Consumer' means a person other than an organization
who seeks or acquires (a) business equipment for use in his business, or (b) real or
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol77/iss2/4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ical privity" only; it does not include third party beneficiaries. The
net effect of the NCA approach is to leave "horizontal privity" as
defined in the UCC70 and to legislatively abolish "vertical privity."
The NCA approach gives consumers satisfactory protection if a
jurisdiction has adopted alternative "B" or "C" in section 2-318 of
the UCC. But West Virginia has adopted alternative "A," the most
restrictive alternative available. Assuming the Legislature will
take corrective action, and assuming further that nothing justifies
a definition of "consumer" that discriminates arbitrarily between
a consumer incurring debt and one paying cash, the Legislature
has only two possible alternatives. It can define "consumer" as the
NCA does, thereby abolishing "vertical privity" and leaving "hori-
zontal privity" as limited in the UCC. Alternatively, the Legis-
lature can enact, as did the Virginia Legislature, a progressive
definition of "consumer" that both abolishes "vertical privity" and
expands "horizontal privity." 7'
The better approach would be to adopt a progressive defini-
tion of "consumer," thereby eliminating the entire privity prob-
lem. A suggested definition that is neither too restrictive nor too
expansive would be: "consumer" means, in addition to anyone who
seeks or acquires consumer goods, any natural person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the use
of such consumer goods. This definition is consistent with the gen-
eral tenor of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection
Act and would serve two distinct functions. First, it would give
West Virginia a workable system of strict warranty liability. 2 The
personal property, services, money or credit for personal, family, household, or
agricultural purposes."
7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318.
7, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965).
72 As Prosser has indicated, warranty as a device for the justification of strict
liability carries far too much luggage. W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
656 (4th ed. 1971). Some of the problems include the limited scope of persons
protected, disclaimers, and the notice requirement. Cady, Law of Products Liabil-
ity in West Virginia, 74 W. VA. L. REv. 283, 300 (1972). These problems should not
prevent the West Virginia approach from being workable. Disclaimers have been
abolished. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-107 (Cum. Supp. 1974). Hopefully, the legis-
lature will expand the scope of coverage. The notice requirement remains but
should not be a substantial barrier to recovery. Notice of a breach of warranty from
the buyer to the seller within a reasonable time after he discovers or should discover
the breach is required by the UCC. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-607(3)(a) (1966). A
few courts have held that, in a personal injury action, notice need not be given.
Wilson v. Modem Mobile Homes, Inc., 376 Mich. 342, 137 N.W.2d 144 (1965);
Wright Bachman, Inc. v. Hodnett, 235 Ind. 307, 133 N.E.2d 713 (1956). Other courts
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most important warranty in the UCC is the implied warranty of
merchantability. The new Act expands the coverage of the war-
ranty of merchantability to include the concept that all goods must
conform in all material respects to applicable state and federal
statutes and regulations that establish standards of quality and
safety.73 Defining "consumer" as the NCA does would also create
strict warranty liability, but its coverage would be limited to those
persons presently protected by section 2-318 of the UCC. The NCA
approach would be an improvement, but does not offer the protec-
tion that a broader definition could afford.
Secondly, the suggested definition of "consumer" would have
considerable impact upon negligence-based actions because the
Act abolishes privity in actions based on negligence as well as those
based on breach of warranty. As previously indicated, twenty-
seven jurisdictions have adopted strict tort liability,74 and eventu-
ally the concept will likely receive judicial recognition in other
jurisdictions. The West Virginia Legislature, by enacting a pro-
gressive definition of "consumer," can set the stage for the accept-
ance of strict tort liability by the West Virginia court.
If the Legislature will wisely define three terms-"merchant,"
"consumer," and "consumer transaction," the West Virginia Con-
sumer Credit and Protection Act will have enormous potential for
assisting injured consumers. Adoption of the suggestions made
herein will provide the injured consumer adequate means to re-
have held that commencement of legal action is sufficient notice. E.g., Davidson
v. Wee, 93 Ariz. 191, 379 P.2d 744 (1963).
Another pitfall for the unwary consumer in a warranty-based-action is the
requirement of reliance. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-313 (1966) declares an express
warranty binding only if it becomes "part of the basis of the bargain." Most signifi-
cantly, this requirement does not apply to implied warranties of merchantibility or
to third parties not in privity with the seller. Id. § 46-2-314; Hinderer v. Ryan, 7
Wash. App. 434, 499 P.2d 252 (1972). One case held that the act of purchase and
use of a product is evidence of reliance on the skill and judgment of the manufac-
turer. Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat of Kennewick, Inc., 60 Wash. 2d 468, 374 P.2d
549 (1962).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6-102(b) (Cum. Supp. 1974). "Merchantable"
means, in addition to the qualities prescribed in section three hundred fourteen
[§ 46-2-3141, that the goods conform in all material respects to applicable state
and federal statutes and regulations establishing standards of quality and safety
for goods and, in the case of goods with mechanical, electrical, or thermal compo-
nents, that the goods are in good working order and will operate properly in normal
usage for a reasonable period of time.
11 See note 23 supra.
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cover and hopefully will give the court the opportunity to follow
the majority of jurisdictions and adopt strict tort liability. Impor-
tantly, adoption of these suggestions will have no impact on the
credit sections of the Act; the suggested alterations seek only to
clarify ambiguous sections regarding the consumer protection as-
pects of the Act. Failure of the Legislature to define these terms
can only lead to uncertainty and unnecessary confusion." The pol-
icy behind the recommended legislative action is fully supported
by judicial precedent and by legislative enactments in other
states.76
Gerard R. Stowers
7 See the discussion of Dawson v. Canteen Corp., No. 13476 (W. Va., filed Feb.
25, 1975), note 52 supra.
11 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (con-
curring opinion). See notes 25, 39, 40 & 62 supra.
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